were able to opt for railway work, road building and harbour improvement. It was commonly argued that, as a result of the war, Africans were relatively affluent, but there is no evidence whatever for this assertion. African claims for war compensation were assessed at ?66I,Io6, but only II 4,000 was available, and that was not paid until i904 (the tax system yielded twice as much every year in Native taxes). Nor were military receipts honoured until 90o4.11 Over 50,000 Transvaal Africans were detained in camps during the last months of the war, in conditions which produced a mortality rate higher than that of the Boer concentration camps, at a cost of less than a penny a day per head.12 It is implausible to argue that any significant number of Africans came through the scorched earth campaign in a state of affluence. Nevertheless opportunities for making a living in the Transvaal do seem to have been better after the war, more as a result of incompetence in the Native Affairs Department than of a noticeably permissive policy. The General Manager of the W.N.L.A. complained that the pre-war practice of bribing chiefs to send their tribesmen to the mines was no longer officially approved, and several other reliable observers commented to the same effect. 13 In one case the Supreme Court even intervened to annul a contract which entailed a chief's undertaking to supply mine labour.l4 No doubt the practice continued, but on a reduced scale. The treatment of Transvaal Africans squatting on Crown Lands also improved. In republican times, officials were also farmers, and made certain that conditions imposed on these squatters were at least as onerous as those imposed on their own employees. British rule involved a division of function between farmer and official, and although the officials generally sympathized with farmers as against their employees, they were too shortstaffed to carry out this particular function as efficiently as it had been carried out before the war. The liability to work was less onerous and less arbitrary for squatters than for labour-tenants, and was paid for at Government rates: the rent-L I per annum per adult-was significantly lower than the real rent in labour, cash and kind paid to farmer-landlords.15 Again, through lack of staff, the Government was remiss in collecting rents: the Landowners' Association angrily protested that the Land Department had collected only ?5,ooo of a possible ?27,ooo, with the results that many of the member's tenants were abandoning their landlords to settle on Crown Africans, but the experiment failed lamentably. Like many other preindustrial peoples, these were horrified at the nature of underground work: some refused to go underground at all, and so were gaoled with hard labour.22 They were fortunate. One in ten of the others died during the year: many others suffered severely from pneumonia, which in some cases permanently impaired their vision.23 The survivors may be assumed to have discouraged their tribesmen from following in their footsteps. Regarding East Africa, mine-owners were encouraged by Johnston's opinion that large numbers of Baganda were available; but official enquiries were rebuffed by Eliot's view that labour in East Africa was already too scarce.24 The Rhodesias were not considered, on the grounds that they were reserved for Rhodesian industrial development. The Portuguese flatly refused to allow recruiting in Angola; and the Foreign Office refused to approach either the Angolan or the Congolese authorities for fear of encouraging forced labour. 25 Governmental decisions in the belt of territory from Mo9ambique to Luanda were less important than the fact that a number of recruiting agencies were already quarrelling over the area. Casement's dispatches throw some light on the scramble for African labour. To the west he observed that Angolan recruiters were filtering into Congolese territory, and that on one occasion a battle had ensued upon the meeting of rival recruiting gangs, so that the local people had been heartened to rebel against both. To the east, he reported infiltration of Portuguese recruiters, presumably agents of the chartered companies, into Barotseland from Mo9ambique.26 In view of the apparently inflated demands for labour in this area, it is tempting to look for a common cause for the risings which were common from South-West Africa and Natal to Angola and German East Africa, during roughly the same period, and even to toy with the idea of a concerted resistance. The Herero Revolt, the Bambata rebellion, the Angola-Congo rising, the conquest of Mosambique, and Maji-Maji seem too close in time to be the result of totally local resentments. At first sight the increased demands for labour appear to offer a single explanation, but the increase was too gradual to provoke such fierce and widespread resistance. East African demands for plantation labour simply succeeded previous demands for slaves: Portuguese 
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forced labour had a very long history, though possibly new areas were being exploited: Rhodes's attempts to tap central Africa date from the late nineteenth century: even Katanga was accustomed to alien demands for labourers. Since the demands were nothing new, it is likely that the revolts were a series of spontaneous reactions which cannot be fitted into a pattern. Since the individual tribal responses are so closely connected with individual local policy decisions by different colonial authorities, the notion of concerted political resistance is a will-o'-the-wisp. A concerted decision among industrial labourers, however, to withold labour for specific economic and 'civil rights' purposes is by no means as far-fetched, and was in fact the interpretation which the Transvaal Commissioner for Native Affairs put upon the shortage.27
Any such decision must necessarily have been made in the mining compounds, the only significant meeting-place for diverse tribesmen. The formal expressions of opinion by South African chiefs, African journalists, and the urbanized, educated group, throw no light whatever upon the matter. Chiefs confined themselves to heart-rending generalities about the loss of their traditional powers; and as they were often involved in sending their followers to work in the mines, they could scarcely criticise the conditions of industrial labour.28 Journalists tended to be immersed in unenlightening quarrels over the respective merits of British and Boer Native policies:29 Koranta ea Becoana was disposed to approve of Milner, and although it criticized specific acts of his civil service, agreed with Khomo's Native Eye that no amount of petty brutalities and injustices would alter their loyalty to the British authorities. The urbanized elite were more concerned with trying to gain their exemption from pass laws, liquor prohibition, and side-walk legislation, than in any more general political programme.30 The political associations were led by traditional chiefs and by petty tradesmen and professional men living in urban locations, whose immediate interests were reflected in the associations' petitions. When the war ended, they expected to see reforms in their favour. Only in I905, when it was clear that Crown Colony rule was expiring, did they express their disillusion regarding the British administration, in terms strikingly similar to those used by white settlers in Kenya in I960. they certainly provide sufficient provocation to have put wind into the sails of a protest movement. When war broke out, gold production came to a halt, and labour was required only for maintenance. Nevertheless the labour force remaining was large enough to embarrass the arriving British administrators. They approached the Director of the Imperial Military Railways, Sir Percy Girouard, who agreed to take over responsibility for I4,000 labourers found in the mining area, and who also provided employment for unemployed Africans who were 'captured' in the Rand area.32 These captives were employed in work which they had not contracted to perform, for a period longer than their contracts stipulated, and at wages well below the contract level. For the duration of the war the situation was tolerated without undue violence; but when the war ended the workers naturally assumed they could go home, and rioted when this hope was dashed. newing their contracts on the mines', as the wastage was 'enormous' and apparently unprecedented: desertion also had assumed serious proportions. 37 The time of this discovery would suggest that workers arriving at the end of the war may have been just as mortified as those who had been on the Rand for its duration. Furthermore, mine managers were aware of the increased opportunities for labour; it must have been some other circumstance which perplexed them. This evidence is compatible with the unhappy observation of the Commissioner for Native Affairs that the war engendered in Africans 'a spirit of independence and apparent aggressiveness which was a new and regrettable feature in relations between black and white', a feature which Lagden thought was aggravated by the post-war demands for labour.38 Finally, throughout the three years following the war, the W.N.L.A. observed that labourers arriving for work were in a poor physical condition: even when the shortage of labour made the Association anxious to place recruits as quickly as possible, it was found necessary to detain one out of eight to recuperate before going to work.39 This could well be an effect of workers witholding their labour as long as was physically practicable, though some workers came vast distances on foot. The evidence is, in the nature of the case, circumstantial, but there are sufficient circumstances to lend the theory some credibility.
If Africans expected British administration to bring about economic or social reforms, they were again disappointed, although a series of economic changes was introduced in order to make the best use of existing labour, and to attract more of it. The rigid wage structure introduced during the war was the first to go: in September and November I902 and again in March 1903 the scale was made more flexible, so as to permit mine managers some discretion in offering better terms for experienced and efficient workers. The encouragement of piece-work rather than daily wages inevitably meant the abandonment of the 30-35s. scale. This change was explicitly recognized in April 1903, when a scale of 45-60s. was adopted, bonuses were allowed for re-enlistment, and managers were exhorted to adopt productivity incentives.40 The slow increase in productivity and in the labour supply were not, however, sufficient to assuage the impatient demands of both the mineowners and of Milner himself. Here it is necessary to distinguish between Milner's hopes and those of the magnates. Since Milner was concerned only with increasing the number of British workers employed, he was not necessarily committed to preserving any particular ratio between white and black labour, and would not have been disturbed by an increased proportion A peculiarity of the controversy in the Transvaal was that the major decisions were taken before white public opinion declared itself. The details concern us here only so far as they relate to the industrial colour-bar, and it is important to notice that in advocating Chinese labour Milner was endorsing the magnate view that white workers must remain an aristocracy. Again, the Chamber of Mines decided that Chinese were necessary before putting the issue before the public, and was therefore poised to exert all its influence in the same direction. The imperial government decreed that it would sanction importation only if it were demonstrated that white opinion in the Transvaal favoured the policy. Since the Boers would almost certainly oppose a measure believed to be to the magnates' advantage, it was necessary to create a semblance of unanimity in the English-speaking white community. The task was by no means beyond the Chamber's abilities, but the necessity for haste led them to make elaborate concessions in detail to their white artisan opponents. These concessions involved restrictions upon the use of 41 imported labour: confinement to compounds, compulsory repatriation at the termination of the three-year contract, and above all the prohibition of the employment of Chinese in an enumerated list of capacities, which obviated the risk of their ever competing with skilled or semi-skilled whites. As van der Horst has observed, 'the occupations designated in the schedule have continued to be claimed as belonging exclusively to Europeans'.44 The decision was not intended by the magnates to be applied against Africans as well, nor was it thought to be in any sense final; and legally the door remained open to the promotion of Africans should the magnates feel strong enough politically to get away with it. It is improbable that the position could have remained ambiguous for much longer anyway, and it is unlikely that the magnates would have succeeded in reducing the realm of the labour aristocracy by very much. More important is the timing of the enactment. The industrial colour-bar was legally drawn so as to recognize the field actually occupied by white workers-with a generous margin added-as exclusively theirs. And it was given legal sanction at a time when such a delimitation allowed the white workers an unusually large realm, since they actually occupied an unusually large proportion of jobs, and the magnates were unusually weak. Had the line been drawn either in 1899 or in I909, when the proportion of white workers was smaller, the number of reserved jobs would probably have been considerably smaller. This addendum to the Importation Ordinance became such an article of faith to artisans that by 1919 they were prepared to defend it with physical force, and it was driven home to the magnates that the price they had paid for a temporary expedient in I903 had become a recurrent burden.
The Importation Ordinance envisaged thousands of Chinese anxiously awaiting the opportunity to share in the development of the Transvaal mines: therefore, as the governor of the Straits Settlements pointed out, it seemed designed to prevent the immigration of Chinese rather than to encourage it.45 In practice, the only people to accept the conditions were from the far North, where the Russo-Japanese war had cut off agricultural labourers from their ordinary means of livelihood.46 These peasants were therefore comparable to the pre-industrial African migrant workers in a way in which the Cantonese would not have been. Regarding wages, the Africans were better off; but they had to make do with older compounds, and since their food cost roughly half as much as that given to the Chinese, no doubt it was rather inferior.56 African contracts were for between six and twelve months, and as they were not as isolated as the Chinese, tribal ethics kept a stronger hold. Nevertheless desertion among Africans was not uncommon, nor was compulsive drinking, while even homosexuality was supposed to be 'very prevalent'. 57 The similarity of effects suggests a fairly close similarity of working conditions.
The arrival of the Chinese undermined the bargaining position of the Africans, and the average monthly wage began to decline, whereas it had steadily increased before. Wages to be paid were ordinarily agreed at the outset of a contract, and as contracts lasted a number of months, statistics providing monthly wage averages are slow to reflect wage trends. In the absence of statistics showing the trend in contract agreements, however, monthly averages will serve the same purpose. Until September I904-four months after the arrival of the first batch of Chinese-African wages continued to rise gradually, reaching a peak of 57s. a month. In October the average was 56s. 8d.; in November 56s. id.; in December 55s. iod.; in January it recovered to 56s. 
SUMMARY
One of the crucial reasons for the failure of British policy in South Africa during the Reconstruction period was an acute shortage of African labour for the mines, which were therefore unable to support a large English-speaking immigrant community. According to the prevailing economic beliefs, there was a fairly rigid ratio between the numbers of unskilled coloured workers and of skilled white workers which the mines could employ, so that the scarcity of African labour did inhibit the mines from expanding their white labour force.
The reasons for this scarcity include the deplorable physical conditions in which labourers lived and worked, and the unusually large demands for African labour in other sectors of the economy. British policy also, inadvertently, put less pressure on Transvaal Africans to take industrial or agricultural employment. However, the scarcity of labour was noticeable not only within British South Africa, but more especially outside its borders, where Africans seem to have been more reluctant than usual to take employment in the mines. It is possible to argue that the shortage was caused partly by the disillusionment of the workers as a result of their experience of British administration, and partly by a fairly extensive determination to withhold labour until conditions were improved. Such an interpretation is compatible with the facts of the case, though impossible at this stage to prove.
Whatever the reasons for the scarcity, the result was the importation of Chinese labour to supplement the existing unskilled labour force. The well-documented complaints of the Chinese labour throw some light on the treatment of African labour. The Chinese also undercut the wages paid to Africans, who lost their commanding position as unconscious arbiters of the success of mining. Further, the Chinese were employed in terms of a very restrictive contract, whose terms were later extended to cover African labour as well, with the result that the industrial colour-bar was solidified at a time when white labour was in control of an unusually large area of employment.
